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FOREIGN PRECEDENTS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
I. INTRODUCTION
The citation of foreign precedents in federal courts has received widespread
attention in the recent past. Supreme Court Justices have debated the
permissibility and effect of citing foreign precedents in interpreting the
Constitution. Much less attention, however, has been focused on the equally
significant citation of the decisions of the World Trade Organization's,
(WTO's) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
The significance of DSB decisions is underscored by the Trade Act of
2002.' In this law, Congress directed the Department of Commerce (DOC) not
to apply any of the United States' implementing legislation with respect to any
agreement negotiated under the auspices of the WTO until the Secretary of
Commerce had issued a report to Congress addressing congressional concerns
as to whether or not the DSB had added or diminished the rights and
obligations of the United States under GATT/WTO agreements. By
conditioning the application ofU. S. commitments under the treaties negotiated
under the auspices of the WTO on the submission of a DOC report,3 Congress
was expressing its concern that the DSB was creating additional obligations for
the United States and therefore diminishing its rights.
Thus, after the enactment of the 2002 Trade Act, one of its chief architects,
then Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucas, criticized the DSB as
a "kangaroo court" for issuing a series of rulings against U.S. trade remedy
Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (codified in scattered sections of
19, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
2 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (2002).
3 That report was transmitted to Congress by the Secretary of Commerce on December 30,
2002, as required. In it, the Secretary of Commerce
allayed congressional fears that the DSB was heavily biased against the U.S.
by systematically marshalling evidence to demonstrate that DSB rulings had
benefited a wide array of U.S. industries and that in those cases in which the
U.S. had lost, the "findings involved technical orprocedural elements of a law
or regulation, or its application, and the United States was easily able to
implement the DSB recommendations without affecting the underlying law
or regulation."
See James Thuo Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy Through International Legal Minimalism:
A Re-Characterization of the Foreign Affairs Trade Doctrine, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 103
(2004) (citing U.S. Trade Representative, Executive Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Dispute
Panels and the Appellate Body: Report to the Congress Transmitted by the Secretary of
Commerce, Part III.c (Dec. 30, 2002), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/FinalDec31Report
corrected.pdf) [hereinafter Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy].
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laws.4 This was not the first time that a member of Congress had expressed
concern that the DSB was overreaching in ruling against U.S. trade laws or
their applications. Underlying these worries was Congress' concern over the
appropriateness of the DSB overruling congressionally enacted provisions of
U.S. trade laws or their applications and interpretations by the DOC.
Congress' concerns may be regarded as expressing the need for democratic
checks on the DSB's judicial review of U.S. laws, their interpretations and
applications.5
Federal courts have for several years been grappling with the effect, if any,
of DSB or GATT panel decisions in construing U.S. statutes in U.S. courts.6
When the United States is a party to a DSB dispute, the resulting DSB decision
will be binding on the United States under international law.7 For this reason,
questions involving DSB decisions in the federal judiciary, like the questions
surrounding the citation of international and foreign decisions in construing the
Constitution, raise important questions. This is especially so because the
United States has voluntarily ratified and has been a primary supporter of the
treaties of the international trading regime that the DSB is charged with the
responsibility of interpreting. The United States is also a major litigant in DSB
cases. Notwithstanding the United States' commitment to a rule-based global
trading system and the binding nature of DSB decisions under international
law, Congress and the courts have taken steps to limit the potential
applicability of DSB decisions considered adverse to the United States.'
Congress has been especially critical of DSB decisions that would require
congressional reversal of federal mandates such as the protection of U.S. labor
and the environment, or those that would prevent the DOC from exercising its
trade remedy mandate.9
' Senator Max Baucas, U.S. Trade Laws and the WTO, Speech to the Global Business
Dialogue (Sept. 26, 2002), http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-ecOO14.html ("I am deeply
troubled about what has been going on in the WTO dispute-settlement process. These
proceedings are looking more and more like a kangaroo court against U.S. trade laws. This trend
must stop. And I am here today to suggest some steps to stop it.").
' See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, andDeference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 193, 194 (1996) (noting that
"dispute settlement by an international body such as GATT or WTO treads on the delicate and
confusing issue of national 'sovereignty' ").
6 See infra note 16.
7 See infra Part III.
See infra Part Ill.
9 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Given this congressional concern, this paper inquires into the status of DSB
decisions in the federal judiciary by seeking to answer two related questions.
First, given that DSB decisions where the United States is a party to the
dispute are binding as a matter of international law, are federal courts bound
to follow such decisions when construing a provision of a U.S. trade statute?
Second, where a provision of a federal statute has been interpreted by the DSB
to be in violation of the United States' GATT/WTO treaty obligations, is a
federal court bound to follow this internationally binding decision?
Based on an extensive survey of the case law, I argue that there are two
lines of cases on the treatment of conflicts between DSB decisions and
domestic statutes. Under the first line of cases, when federal courts are faced
with an ambiguous statute, they decline to rely on a DSB decision as the only
basis to strike down a U.S. agency's interpretation of the statute. The rationale
for this outcome is twofold. First, in the event of a conflict between the
holding in a DSB decision and an interpretation or application of a statute by
a U.S. agency, the agency interpretation or application of the statute trumps a
DSB decision to the contrary. This means that if upholding a domestic statute
would create a GATT/WTO violation, the court would have no choice but to
create such a violation. Second, in the event of an actual conflict between a
statute and a DSB decision, it is a matter for Congress rather than the federal
courts to decide and remedy.'" This line of cases, therefore, treats the domestic
legal regime as a separate and distinct sphere from the international legal
domain, and in the event of a conflict, the domestic statute trumps the
international legal obligation. Under this line of cases, courts do not
distinguish between ambiguous or unambiguous statutes in relation to
conflicting DSB decisions, since these courts conceive their role as being
simply that of affirming congressional intent. Thus, the judicial function is to
establish if an agency's interpretation or application of a statute is consistent
with a discernable legislative intent and to uphold such interpretation or
application even if doing so would be inconsistent with a DSB decision
directly on point.
A second and less dominant line of cases holds that the interpretation or
application of ambiguous statutes requires domestic courts, as a principle of
domestic statutory construction, to interpret ambiguous statutes in conformity
with the United States' international obligations. Under this line of cases, the
claim for interpreting ambiguous statutes is not based on a presumed
superiority of GATT/WTO law to domestic law or the idea that GATT/WTO
10 See infra Part III.
2005]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
law is part of domestic law. Rather, the claim is that in interpreting ambiguous
statutes, courts have discretion to defer to agency interpretations and
applications where the agency's application or interpretation was made to
conform with a DSB decision or a GATT/WTO obligation. Therefore, the rule
that domestic law supersedes where GATT/WTO law or a DSB decision
conflicts with domestic law is still true even under this line of cases. The
difference from the first line of cases is that rather than using the domestic
statute to trump the DSB decision, courts use domestic statutory interpretation
techniques to defer to agency interpretations and applications of ambiguous
statutes where those interpretations and applications were influenced by
considerations of conforming domestic law to a DSB decision or a
GATT/WTO obligation. When they invoke this line of cases, courts invariably
give- consideration to minimizing conflicts with international law. By
declining to find DSB decisions as inconsistent with federal law, these courts
in effect give deference to agencies applying or interpreting the statute because
of their competence and expertise. As a result, courts defer to agency
decisions by taking into account the significance of a variety of factors. These
factors include decisions on whether or not to minimize conflicts between U.S.
law and policy on one hand, and on the other hand, whether to reduce conflicts
with the United States' GATT/WTO obligations, which include those
contained in DSB decisions. My discussion of Turtle Island Restoration
Network v. Evans" (Turtle Island) and Federal Mogul Corp. v. United States 2
(Federal Mogul) in Part II best illustrates the approach in this line of cases.
By upholding domestic law in the event of a conflict between DSB
decisions and domestic law, courts in the first line of cases follow a
congressional pattern of insulating the United States from its international
trade obligations. The effect of this line of cases is that U.S. trade remedy
laws protect domestic industries and producers in ways that would be
impermissible under a good faith application of the United States' treaty
commitments. In addition, by treating U.S. trade laws as superior to
GATT/WTO treaties and by declining to interpret and apply U.S. trade laws
consistently with the United States' GATT/WTO treaty commitments, federal
courts adopting this reasoning acquiesce to the derogation, violation, and
disregard of the United States' treaty obligations set in place by Congress and
the executive branch."l Ultimately, this Article shows that under the first line
" Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Evans, 538 U.S. 960 (2003).
12 Fed. Mogul Corp. v. United States, 70 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
13 See infra Part III.F and G.
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of cases, federal courts have adopted the view that unless the political branches
of the government authorize the recognition of GATT/WTO law or indeed of
a DSB decision, then courts cannot treat them as sources of federal law.14
When courts move from the premise that the qualifications placed by Congress
in legislation implementing GATT/WTO obligations subordinates the United
States' treaty commitments to domestic statutes, the effect of these
qualifications renders these obligations largely, if not entirely, irrelevant in
federal litigation. As the second and less frequently resorted to line of cases
shows, however, these outcomes are not the inevitable result of judicial
interpretation. This is particularly so where an agency such as the DOC crafts
a policy with the view to conforming it to international legal obligations such
as those contained in a DSB decision to which the United States was a party.
In cases arising from such agency action, like Turtle Island, federal courts can
uphold the agency's policy as being consistent with the clear meaning of a
statute. Turtle Island thus demonstrates that courts can, under domestic law,
arrive at a decision consistent with the United States' international legal
obligations when confronted with a DSB decision finding a U.S. law
inconsistent with a GATT/WTO obligation. Therefore, Turtle Island is a good
example of a judicial approach that teaches us that domestic law can be
mobilized to ensure that the United States acts consistently with the principle
that a violation of an international legal obligation is not excusable on the
premise that the violation is permissible under domestic law. 5
To make this argument, I proceed as follows: Part II traces two lines of
cases outlining the interpretive utility of DSB and GATT decisions in the
federal judiciary. Part III examines the policy objections to the DSB's
sanctioning mandate and a variety of theoretical approaches to overcoming the
direct effect of DSB decisions within the United States. In this part, I also
briefly examine the international legal consequences of the first line of cases
that subordinates the United States' international legal obligations to domestic
law. I will end the Article in Part IV with concluding comments.
14 By proceeding as such, federal courts have therefore adopted an argument analogous to
the revisionist argument that without the authority of the political branches, customary
international law is not a source of federal law. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARv. L. REv. 815, 870 (1997) (arguing that absent authorization from the federal political
branches, customary international law should not have the status of federal law, and that this is
the view largely endorsed by federal courts).
15 See infra Part IV.E.
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H. DSB DECISIONS IN U.S. COURTS
A. Under International Law, DSB Decisions Are Binding on Parties to a
Dispute
Under international law, WTO dispute settlement decisions that have been
adopted by GATT contracting parties and the DSB are binding on the parties
with respect to resolving a dispute between them.'6 In addition, DSB decisions
are binding irrespective of non-compliance by a party to the dispute in which
the decision was rendered and irrespective of the ability of the WTO or of the
winning party to enforce them. 7 Since DSB decisions are binding only as to
parties to a dispute, they generally do not create a binding precedent in
subsequent WTO cases. They are, however, "often considered by subsequent
panels"' 8 and "create legitimate expectations among WTO members," 9 and as
such, the Appellate Body has argued that they should "be taken into account
where they are relevant to any dispute."2°
Leading WTO jurist, John H. Jackson, has argued that Article 3.2 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding makes certainty and predictability the
linchpin of the dispute settlement system. He argues that the nature of the
rule-based GATT/WTO system assures security and predictability through the
"idea that full compliance is an international law obligation.",2' To reach this
conclusion, Jackson examines Paragraph 4 of Article 16 of the Agreement
Establishing the WTO, which obliges WTO members to "ensure ... [the]
conformity of... [their] laws, regulations and administrative procedures, 22
16 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 9, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct.
4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan Taxes]. See also John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO
Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to "Buy Out, " 98 AM. J. INT'L L.
109 (2004) (arguing that adopted WTO dispute settlement decisions are binding as a matter of
international law) [hereinafter Jackson, Obligation to Comply].
"7 John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandings on the
Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 60-61 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson, Dispute
Settlement Understanding].
IS Japan-Taxes, supra note 16, 9.
19 Id.
20 Id. See also Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO
Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1999) (making the case
that although there is no de jure stare decisis system at the WTO, the DSB follows a stare decisis
system in practice and that there are strong reasons for adopting a de jure stare decisis system).
21 Jackson, Obligation to Comply, supra note 16, at 122.
22 Id at 112 (citing Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, para.
4, art. 16, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter Anti-Dumping
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with the various WTO Agreements, the preparatory work of GATT and other
provisions of WTO law, and decades of practice that debunk the view that a
country can buy-out of its obligation to comply with a DSB decision.23
Jackson also advances several policy reasons arguing in favor of the
bindingness of DSB decisions and against arguments that suggest flexibility
in the status of these decisions. His argument here is that neither the text of
the WTO treaty nor the underlying policy of its dispute settlement system
suggest that DSB decisions are intended to be flexible or negotiable. Below,
I examine two cases in which, consistent with Jackson's view, the DSB found
certain applications of U.S. law to be inconsistent with the United States'
obligations under one WTO treaty.
B. DSB Decisions Finding US. Statutes in Violation of GATT/WTO Treaty
Obligations
Is a federal court bound to follow a DSB decision that has declared a
federal statute to be in violation of the United States' GATT/WTO treaty
obligations? 24 To answer this question, I examine two recent reports where the
DSB declared a U.S. practice to be inconsistent with the United States'
obligations under the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
But first, what is anti-dumping? In short, "the purpose of anti-dumping law
is to counteract the effect of price discrimination in sales by a foreign producer
which results in injury to the industry of the importing country."25 In this
sense,
[A]nti-dumping law is aimed at protecting industries in importing
countries from unfair pricing policies or predatory competition
engaged in by an industry in a second country. The premise of
anti-dumping law under the theory of competitive advantage is
that an industry in one country is selling its products in a second
country at below cost of production or less than fair value.26
Agreement]).
23 Id. at 112-14.
24 This question is also relevant where a DSB decision, which does not involve the United
States, declares that another country's practice, which is similar to the United States, violates one
of the GATT/WTO treaties. Zeroing, discussed later, is one of these policies.
25 Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy, supra note 3, at 53.
26 Id.
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The margin of dumping is calculated by deducting sales of the like product in
the foreign market from similar sales in the domestic market.
The two cases I discuss challenged a practice referred to as zeroing in
dumping calculations. When computing sales in a foreign market, zeroing
entails assigning a zero value to non-dumped sales instead of deducting them
from dumped or less than fair value sales. By assigning such sales a zero value
instead of deducting them from dumped or less than fair value sales, zeroing
has the effect of inflating the margin of dumping.
In both European Communities-Anti-DumpingDuties on Imports of Cotton-
Type Bed Linen from India (Bed Linen)27 and United States-Final Anti-
Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (Softwood
Lumber),28 the DSB found that zeroing practices violated Article 2.4.2 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement. In the Bed Linen case, the Appellate Body held
that the European Union's practice of zeroing violated the Anti-Dumping
Agreement since this practice did not take into account all comparable export
transactions in calculating the dumping margin. 29 By giving non-dumped sales
a zero value rather than deducting them from the margin of dumping, the
Appellate Body held that zeroing distinguished between the presence of
successful import competition on the one hand, and injury caused by imports
on the other. Similarly, in Softwood Lumber, the United States' zeroing
practice was struck down by a DSB panel,3° and in February of 2004, the
European Community requested the formation of a WTO panel to hear its
complaint regarding thirty-one zeroing cases in which it argued that the United
States had violated Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-dumping Agreement.3'
27 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of
Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS 141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Bed Linen].
2 Panel Report, United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from
Canada, WT/DS264/R (Apr. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Softwood Lumber].
29 BedLinen, supra note 27, 65 (stating that "the practice of 'zeroing'... as applied by the
European Communities in the anti-dumping investigation at issue in this dispute, is inconsistent
with Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement").
30 Softwood Lumber, supra note 28, 108 (holding that "based on the ordinary meaning of
Article 2.4.2 read in its context .... zeroing is prohibited when establishing the existence of
margins of dumping under the weighted-average-to-weighted average methodology").
3" News Release, EU Requests WTO Panel on U.S. Anti-Dumping Methodology (Feb. 18,
2004), http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2004/20040020.htm.
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C. The Treatment of Zeroing in U.S. Courts Before the 1994 Anti-Dumping
Agreement
Prior to the passage of the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement, which has been
interpreted by the DSB to make zeroing illegal,32 zeroing was often engaged
in and considered legal under the 1979 Anti-Dumping Agreement.33
For example, Bowe Passat Reinigungs-Und Waschereitechnik GMBH v.
United States (Bowe Passat)3 4 was decided in 1996 under the 1979 Anti-
dumping Code and was among the first cases in which a foreign importer
challenged the DOC's zeroing methodology. This case involved dumping of
dry cleaning machinery from Germany. Although the Court of International
Trade gave credence to the view that .zeroing methodology overestimates
dumping margins by assigning all entries that have a higher U.S. price than
average foreign price a zero value rather than a negative margin, it nevertheless
upheld the zeroing methodology.35 According to the court, "[u]nless and until
it becomes clear that such a practice is impermissible or unreasonable,. . . the
Court must defer to [the Department of] Commerce's chosen methodology. 36
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States (Algoma Steel),37 dealing with an anti-
dumping dispute with Canada, upheld a calculation of less than fair value that
arguably conflicted with the United States' obligations under the 1979 Anti-
Dumping Agreement.38 While in Algoma Steel the question of the relationship
between U.S. law and GATT obligations did not arise, the court nevertheless
held that in the case of a conflict between U.S. legislation and the United
32 See, e.g., supra note 30 and accompanying text.
" Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 9650,31 U.S.T. 4919 [hereinafter Tokyo Round Agreement].
3' Bowe Passat Reinigungs-Und Waschereitechnik GMBH v. United States, 20 Ct. Int'l
Trade 558 (1996).
31 Id. at 570-71 (acknowledging the inherent statistical bias of the zeroing methodology).
36 Id. at 572.
17 Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
38 Id. at 242 (noting that "[wie have also considered the General Agreements on Tarriffs and
Trade (GATT). Congress no doubt meant to conform the statutory language to the GAT', but
we are not persuaded it embodies any clear position contrary to ours."). See also Tokyo Round
Agreement, supra note 33, art. 3.4 (stating that "It must be demonstrated that the dumped
imports are, through the effects of dumping, causing injury within the meaning of the Code.
There may be other factors which at the same time are injuring the industry, and the injuries
caused by other factors must not be attributed to dumped imports.").
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States' obligations under the then existing 1979 anti-dumping codes, U.S.
legislation would prevail. 9
D. Zeroing Decisions in U.S. Courts Following the 1994 Anti-Dumping
Agreement
Both Bowe Passat and Algoma Steel were decided before the BedLinen and
Softwood Lumber cases which established that zeroing methodologies were
inconsistent with Article 2.4.2 of the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement.4 ° In this
section, I discuss cases that have been decided since these decisions were
announced.
In Corus Staal BV v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce (Corus Staal),4' a case that
came before the United States Court of International Trade, the plaintiff
challenged an adverse anti-dumping investigation. The challenge primarily
relied on the DSB decision in the Bed Linen case,42 which found the zeroing
methodology to be in violation of Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement.
While the Corus Staal court acknowledged that "WTO decisions may help
inform its decisions,"43 it found that it could not "solely rely upon a non-
binding interpretation of an international agreement as grounds to strike a
United States agency interpretation of a statute." 44 Instead, it reasoned that
"WTO decisions are not binding upon commerce or the court," '45 and that "it
appears that WTO decisions are not binding on the WTO itself.,46 The court
'9 Algoma Steel, 865 F.2d at 242 (noting that "[s]hould there be a conflict [between U.S.
legislation and its obligations under the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code], the United States legislation
must prevail").
o Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides:
Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4 [of this
article], the existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase
shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of weighted aver-
age normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export
transactions or by a comparison of normal value and export prices on a
transaction-to-transaction basis.
Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 22, art. 2.4.2.
41 Corus Staal BV v.,U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003).
42 See generally Bed Linen, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
4' Corus Staal, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
"Id.
s Id. (citing Hyundai Elecs. Co. v. United States, 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 302 (1999) and
Footwear Distribs. & Retailers of Am. v. United States, 18 Ct. Int'l Trade 391 (1994)).
46 Id. (noting "[tihe common law concept of stare decisis does not expressly apply to WTO
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thus concluded that "[w]hen faced with an ambiguous statute and ambiguous
international agreement, the court should defer to [the Department of]
Commerce's interpretation." '47
In reaching this decision, the Corus Staal court did actually look at the
language of Article 2.4.2, which provides that dumping margins shall be
established based upon a comparison of a weighted average normal value with
a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions. 48 Rather
than finding an inconsistency, the Corus Staal court cited Bowe Passat for the
proposition that it was "wary of a methodology that intentionally minimizes
the impact of nondumped transactions by manipulating the data of potentially
equalizing sales." '49 As such, the Corus Staal court found that the zeroing
methodology technically complied with the statute and the anti-dumping
agreement since it took into account non-dumped imports by giving them a
zero value.5°
Below, I will illustrate that though DSB decisions are not binding on U.S.
courts, they may nevertheless help inform U.S. court decisions.
E. DSB Decisions May Help Inform U.S. Courts of International Trade
Decisions
Similarly, in PAM, S.p.A. v. U.S. Dep 't ofCommerce,51 the court noted the
relevance of the Bed Linen case which declared zeroing inconsistent with
WTO principles. The Court of International Trade held that Bed Linen was
nevertheless not binding on the United States. The DOC's zeroing was very
similar to the European Union's although the United States was not a party to
the BedLinen dispute in which zeroing was held to contraverse the 1994 Anti-
Dumping Agreement. 2 The court also noted that although DSB decisions are
not precedents and do not have a binding effect on the law of the United States,
rulings").
47 Id.
48 Id. at 1262 (discussing the anti-dumping requirements under the 1994 Anti-Dumping
Agreement).
49 Id. at 1263.
S0 Id. at 1264-65.
SI PAM, S.p.A. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003).
52 Id. at 1372 (stating that "[d]espite these similarities, BedLinen is not a basis for striking
the Department's zeroing methodology. WTO panel and appellate decisions are non-binding on
third parties") (citing Corus Staal, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1253 and Hyundai, 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 302).
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the "reasoning of such decisions may help inform the court's decision.,1 3 This
proposition, that the reasoning in a DSB decision directly relevant to the case
before the Court of International Trade may help inform its decision, is
particularly important to the extent that the DOC had previously argued that
DSB decisions had no bearing on the Court of International Trade's decisions.
Nevertheless, the dicta that DSB decisions may help inform a U.S. court in its
decision making may yet have no significance since under this view, DSB
decisions are non-binding. By contrast, in the next section, I examine cases in
which courts have suggested that while DSB decisions are not binding, federal
statutes may not be construed to contravene DSB decisions.
F. Federal Statutes Should Not Be Construed to Conflict with GATT
Obligations
In Federal Mogul,54 the Federal Circuit stated that "GATT agreements are
international obligations, and absent express Congressional language to the
contrary, statutes should not be interpreted to conflict with international
obligations."55 The court quoted the Charming Betsy doctrine56 and Fundicao
Tupy S.A. v. United States (Fundicao),57 which held "[a]n interpretation and
application of the statute which would conflict with the GATT Codes would
clearly violate the intent of Congress."5"
Notwithstanding the Charming Betsy doctrine that statutes should not be
construed to conflict with the United States' international obligations, in
Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A.,' 9 the Federal Circuit rejected the
argument that a statutory provision should be read consistently with the
obligations of the United States as a signatory of GATT.60 Instead, the court
reasoned that:
5 Id. (citing Hyundai, 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 302).
14 Fed. Mogul, 63 F.3d at 1581.
55 Id.
16 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.").
" Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 23 (1987).
58 Id. at 29.
'9 Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
60 Id. at 667-68.
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[E]ven if we were convinced that [the DOC's] interpretation
conflicts with the GATT,... the GATT is not controlling. While
we acknowledge Congress's interest in complying with U.S.
responsibilities under the GATT, we are bound not by what we
think Congress should or perhaps wanted to do, but by what
Congress in fact did. The GATT does not trump domestic
legislation; if the statutory provisions at issue here are
inconsistent with the GATT, it is a matter for Congress and not
this court to decide and remedy.6"
The Fifth Circuit followed this view in Mississippi Poultry Ass 'n v.
Madigan (Mississippi Poultry).62 After quoting the foregoing paragraph, it
held that it must "give effect to Congress' intent, even if implementation of
that intent is virtually certain to create a violation of the GATT."63 It further
stated, "[r]egardless of whether Congress' choice should prove to be unwise
or disruptive, that choice itself has been made absolutely."'
In Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America v. United States
(Footwear Distributors),65 after explaining the court's long-standing
declination to decide foreign policy matters, the Court of International Trade
added that:
However cogent the reasoning of the GATT panels reported
above, it cannot and therefore does not lead to the precise
domestic, judicial relief for which the plaintiff prays. That is,
that relief simply does not attach. Rather, a party..., having
sought and obtained a favorable panel ruling, has and has had
relief available to it via suspension of its obligations to the
offending party pursuant to Article XXIII of the General
Agreement.66
61 Id.
62 Miss. Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993).
63 Id. at 1366.
64 Id. at 1367-68.
65 Footwear Distribs., 18 Ct. Int'l Trade 391.
66 Id. at 414.
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G. Interpreting Intersections Between U.S. Statutes andRelevant GA TT/WTO
Law
In Mississippi Poultry,67 the Fifth Circuit laid down three separate, but
related, maxims governing the interpretation of statutes in relation to foreign
affairs issues including treaty obligations:
First, Congress may abrogate a treaty or international obligation
entered into by the United States only by a clear statement of its
intent to do so. Second, the extraterritorial application of
domestic laws requires a clear statement of congressional intent
so as "to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international
discord." And finally, "it has been a maxim of statutory
construction since the decision in [Charming Betsy], that 'an act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations, if any other possible construction remains.' ,68
The court then discussed these three maxims in the context of a case involving
an alleged violation of the United States' GATT obligations. With regard to
the first maxim, which requires a clear statement from Congress to abrogate
a treaty, the court noted that this maxim is not relevant where "Congress is not
abrogating a treaty or an international obligation ... [and] Congress has at
most evinced an intent to place the [statute] in violation of the GATT.''69
Likewise, the court found that the second maxim was distinguishable since
it only applies in a case where the issue is whether the "application of
American law would directly affect the sovereignty ofa foreign nation.,,70 For
example, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa71 was decided pursuant to this maxim
because the "defendants were corporations owned by the Republic of France,
so for all practical purposes a foreign sovereign was a party in the law suit. 72
67 Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1365.
61 Id. at 1365 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. 244 (1991) and Weinberger v.
Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982)).
69 Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1366 (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 1367 (emphasis added).
71 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S.
522 (1987).
72 Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1367.
[Vol. 34:1
FOREIGN PRECEDENTS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
UnitedStates v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica" also fell into this category because
it involved extraterritorial application of the U.S. law to a Canadian
corporation.74
The court in Mississippi Poultry rejected the application of the third
maxim-that "an act of Congress should not be construed to violate the law of
nations if there is an alternative construction available"--with regard to its
application to the GATT or any multilateral trade agreement." Mississippi
Poultry, however, is easily distinguishable today since at the time the case was
decided in 1993, the Uruguay Round negotiations did not qualify as "the law
of nations," because the negotiations were non-binding as they did not
constitute a final result.76
In Footwear Distributors,77 decided after the Uruguay Round Agreements
came into force, the Court of International Trade cited Paquete Habana" for
the following proposition: "International law is a part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice ofappropriatejurisdiction
as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination."79
It also stated, by quoting section 321 of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Restatement), the guiding
principle that "every international agreement in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.""0 Further, in
quoting from a comment to section 115 of the Restatement, it stated:
[I]nternational obligations survive restrictions imposed by
domestic law. Hence, the general assumption that 'Congress
does not intend to repudiate an international obligation of the
13 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
14 One of the defendants, Aluminum Limited, was a Canadian corporation, and in response
to the question of "whether Congress intended to impose the liability, and whether our own
Constitution permitted it to do so," the court stated that "[w]e should not impute to Congress an
intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within
the United States." Id. at 443.
71 Miss. Poultry, 992 F.2d at 1367.
76 Id. at n.45 (stating that "[t]he Uruguay Round negotiations... cannot bind the United
States as there is no final result").
77 Footwear Distribs., 18 Ct. Int'l Trade 391.
71 Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
79 Footwear Distribs., 18 Ct. Int'l Trade at 409 (quoting Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700
(1900)).
so Id.
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United States ... Therefore, when an act of Congress and an
international agreement... relate to the same subject, the courts,
regulatory agencies, and the Executive Branch will endeavor to
construe them so as to give effect to both.8
The court also acknowledged that the DOC is entitled to deference in its
construction of the statute. 2 It stated that "the best perspective is that both
[the GATT panel and the U.S. agency] are entitled to that degree of respect
which their reasonings compel,"83 though the court did not specifically address
whether either should be given more deference than the other. With respect
to GATT obligations, the court stated that: "GATT... became part of U.S.
law via executive order in accordance with congressional delegation of power
to the President... And it is well established that an international agreement
or treaty which operates without the aid of legislation... 'constitutes a part of
the supreme law of the land.' "84
Nevertheless, it rejected the argument that panel decisions are binding on
U.S. courts.85 It reasoned that there were no provisions for the panel decisions
in U.S. law, "even though affirmed by the appellate body and adopted by the
[Dispute Settlement Body], [they] are binding on the parties., 86 The court also
contrasted the provision of the GATT with chapter 19 of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which "specifically provides that decisions
of panels reviewing antidumping and countervailing-duty determinations of the
three contracting governments are binding."8"
Hyundai Electronics Co. v. United States (Hyundai)88 confirmed Footwear
Distributors. In Hyundai, the Court of International Trade stated "[w]hile
Footwear Distributors concerned an adopted GATT panel report, the same
principles apply to the WTO report... [and] the WTO panel report does not
constitute binding precedential authority for the court. ' 89 The court reasoned
that:
81 Id.
82 Id. at 410.
83 Id.
84 Id. (quoting Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884)).
85 Id.
81 Id. at 412.
87 Id.
88 Hyundai, 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 302.
89 Id. at 312.
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Congress made this clear when it codified the principles espoused
in Footwear Distributors as part of the [Uruguay Round
Amendments Act]. Specifically, Congress provided that the
response to an adverse WTO panel report is the province of the
-executive branch.90
It further stated, "When confronted with a conflict between an international
obligation and U.S. law, it is of course true that an unambiguous statute will
prevail over the international concern." 9
A different rule applies with respect to ambiguous statutes. As the court
noted, "Chevron must be applied in concert with the Charming Betsy doctrine
when the latter doctrine is implicated."92 Since the relationship between these
two doctrines seems to be at the core of the Hyundai case, below I will engage
in a more detailed analysis of these two doctrines.
H. The Relationship Between the Charming Betsy and Chevron Doctrines
As noted earlier, it has long been a maxim since the decision of Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy that in construing international law,
[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the
law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and
consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or
to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law
of nations as understood in this country.
93
On the other hand, there is another doctrine that calls for giving deference
to an agency's interpretation and application of a statute. In Chevron U.S.A.,
" Id. (citing Uruguay Round Amendments Act, Uruguay Round Implementation and Dispute
Settlement, 19 U.S.C. § 3538 (1994)) [hereinafter URAA].
91 Id. (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 313 (citing DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988). See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied
Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the MisplacedLegacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMiN. L. REv. 735,
737 (2002) (exploring "the tension between the implied delegation theory set forth in Chevron
and competing expertise-based rationales for judicial deference to agency work product"). But
see Patricia M. Wald, JudicialReview in Mid-Passage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts
and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 243 (1996) (identifying the manipulative use of
Chevron to reach desired results).
" Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118.
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Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron),94 the Supreme
Court established a two-step analysis:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First,
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 95
The Chevron court argued that "[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for
the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation." 96 Therefore, the
court concluded that:
Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute .... We have long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of
a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle
of deference to administrative interpretations "has been
consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the
meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting
policies. 97
Thus, where an agency's construction or application of a statute is
"permissible," rather than arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute, a
" Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9' Id. at 842-43.
96 Id. at 843-44.
97 Id. at 844 (internal citation omitted).
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court will sustain it under Chevron. Courts will generally apply a
reasonableness standard in determining the permissibility of a construction or
application of a statute.98 Under this standard, a court "need not conclude that
the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to
uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if
the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding."99
In Hyundai,'00 the court found that deference to an agency's construction
or application of a statute under Chevron superseded deference to international
legal obligations under the Charming Betsy doctrine.'0 '
. The Chevron Doctrine: Deference to the DOC's Trade Remedy Mandate
Almost without exception, GATT or DSB decisions are cited by importers
in U.S. courts challenging DOC decisions imposing penalties on them under
U.S. trade remedy laws. By citing GATT or WTO dispute decisions, these
importers seek to use the GATT/WTO framework to reign in what they
perceive to be inconsistencies with the United States' international obligations.
In fact, the WTO describes checking protectionist pressures amongst its
members as one of the benefits to WTO membership.10 2
By contrast, the subordination of the Charming Betsy doctrine to the
Chevron deference of the DOC's trade remedy mandate essentially legitimates
congressionally mandated protectionism. Thus, in Serampore Industries Pvt.
v. Dep 't of Commerce (Serampore),°3 the Court of International Trade upheld
the DOC' s refusal to offset Serampore's sales at fair value against its (dumped)
sales at less than fair value by invoking Chevron to justify deference to the
DOC's computations. 1 4 Yet, such a computation, in so far as non-dumped
sales were given a zero rather than a negative value in computing dumping
margins, was arguably inconsistent with the United States' obligations under
the then existing 1979 GATT anti-dumping codes. While the Bed Linen and
Soft Lumber DSB cases, which outlawed the related practice of zeroing made
98 Id. at 845.
99 Id. at 843 n. 11.
'00 Hyundai, 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 302.
'0' Id. at 305.
102 Indeed, this is one of the advantages of WTO rules as defined by the WTO itself; see
World Trade Organization, 10 Benefits of the WTO Trading System, at 13, http://www.wto.org/
english/res-e/doload-e/1 Obe.pdf.
103 Serampore Indus. Pvt. v. Dep't of Commerce, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 866 (1987).
'04 Id. at 874.
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under the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement, had not been made, the Serampore
andAlgoma Steel cases demonstrate that the DOC's protectionist computations
and their legitimation by federal courts pre-dates the 1994 Anti-Dumping
Agreement. The manner in which this protectionist, and arguably inconsistent
with GATT/WTO, result was reached in Serampore was by giving substantial
deference to the DOC's interpretation of its statutory mandate and its methods
of administering anti-dumping law by zeroing. In so doing, the Serampore
court laid the groundwork for establishing the legal permissibility of zeroing
under U.S. law.
In declining to use Serampore's fair value sales to offset its less than fair
value sales, the court argued that Congress had directed the DOC, the agency,
to find unlawful only those agency determinations and methods "unsupported
by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law."' °5 Under this "substantial evidence"'0 6 standard, the Serampore court
argued that it would affirm the agency's findings so long as they were
supported in the record by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 7  Thus, if an agency's
interpretation or application of a statute does not clearly contravene a
discernable legislative intent, the court must uphold it as sufficiently
reasonable.'0° Accordingly, the court held that "[a] plain reading of the statute
[on anti-dumping law] disclose[d] no provision for [the DOC] to offset sales
made at LTFV [less than fair value] with sales made at fair value.""'9 Instead,
according to the court, the practice of considering negative margins as zero
ensures that less than fair value sales are not covered up or masked by more
profitable sales."'
J Unraveling Two Streams of Cases
So far, I have shown that federal courts are almost without exception likely
to defer to the government's interpretation or application of an ambiguous
105 Id. at 869 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516 a(b)(1)(B) (1982)).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 872.
108 Id. (citing Kelley v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) and Am.
Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
1"9 Id. at 873 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982), which provides that if the DOC finds that
foreign goods are being sold at less than fair value, then a duty shall be imposed equal to the
amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the U.S. price for the merchandise).
110 Id. at 874.
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statute even if such deference would result in disregarding a DSB decision to
the contrary. This pattern of deference, however, is not the inevitable
consequence of unbending rules of construction. Although it conceded that
DSB decisions are not binding on the federal judiciary, the State Department
effectively argued in Turtle Island.' that the interpretation or application of
an ambiguous statute should, as a principle of statutory construction, require
that an ambiguous U.S. statute "be interpreted in conformity with the
international obligations of the United States." ' 2 This decision is crucial since
the court held that an ambiguous statute should to the extent possible be
construed consistently with the United States' international obligations. In a
brief filed on an appeal from the Court of International Trade to the Federal
Circuit, the State Department argued that its interpretation of § 609 of the
Department of Commerce Appropriations Act. 3 should be sustained because
it "minimizes potential conflict with international laws, as revealed in [a]
continuing international dispute" about its interpretation and application.' 4
At issue in Turtle Island was whether § 609 required the United States to
prohibit the import of all shrimp or shrimp products from nations not certified
by the State Department or whether § 609 only empowered the State
Department to allow importation of particular shipments of shrimp and shrimp
products harvested by shipping vessels equipped with technology which would
not adversely affect the protected species of sea turtles under U.S. law.' ' The
plaintiffs, comprised of a group of environmental organizations and
individuals, contended that § 609 required the State Department to exclude
from the United States any shrimp or shrimp products from all nations that
were not certified as having adopted commercial fishing technology, such as
turtle excluder devices, that would not adversely affect the protected species
of sea turtles under domestic law." 6
The controversy in this case stemmed from a change in the State
Department's § 609 Guidelines. While in 1991 and 1993, national certification
under the § 609 Guidelines was the only way a nation could export shrimp to
the United States," 7 in its 1996 and 1999 Guidelines, the State Department
.. Turtle Island, 284 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
12 Footwear Distribs., 18 Ct. Int'l Trade at 413.
113 Department of Commerce Appropriations Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1990).
114 Reply Brief of Federal Defendants-Cross Appellants at 2, Turtle Island, No. 98-09-02818
(Fed. Cir. May 23, 2001) [hereinafter Reply Brief].
115 Turtle Island, 284 F.3d at 1285-86.
116 Id. at 1292.
"7 Id. at 1287.
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permitted exports of shrimp from uncertified nations as long as they attested
that particular shipments were harvested without adversely affecting the
protected categories of turtles. 8 It was this shift in the Guidelines that the
plaintiffs contended was contrary to Congress' intent to ban all shrimp exports
from uncertified countries.'19
The State Department argued that the shift from its 1991 and 1993
Guidelines to the 1999 Guidelines was, in part, prompted by a DSB decision
where the Appellate Body found that while § 609 was a permissible
conservation measure under GATT Article XX, its enforcement was
discriminatory insofar as it required countries to adopt a regulatory regime
similar to that of the United States as the only path to certification.' 20 While
the Court of International Trade had twice upheld the plaintiffs' interpretation
of § 609,121 the Federal Circuit concurred with the State Department's
interpretation as contained in its revised Guidelines under which exports of
shrimp shipments certified to have been harvested with turtle-safe technology,
rather than shipments only from certified countries, were allowed into the
United States. The court reasoned that this conclusion was warranted by the
express language of the statute and by congressional intent since Congress'
aim was to "protect the domestic shrimping industry, not the sea turtle.' 122
While the Federal Circuit found that § 609 was unambiguous, and it
therefore did not reach the question of whether the State Department's
interpretation would minimize potential conflicts with international trade
agreements, it is instructive that its decision affirmed the State Department's
interpretation of the statute. More importantly, the State Department's
interpretation of the statute had been changed to conform to the DSB's finding
that the application of the prior Guidelines were inconsistent with the United
States' international obligations under Article XX of the 1994 GATT
Agreement. 24 The State Department added credence to its claims by arguing
that a subsequent DSB decision had found the application of its 1998
Guidelines did not conflict with the United States' obligations under Article
..8 Id. at 1290.
119 Id. at 1288.
120 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, 47, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 12, 1998).
121 Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Mallet, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 627 (2000); Earth Island
Inst. v. Daley, 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 215 (1999).
122 Turtle Island, 284 F.3d at 1294.
123 Id at 1297.
124 Reply Brief, supra note 114, at 18.
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XX. In its brief on behalf of the State Department, the Attorney General had
argued:
[I]t is clear that the State Department's interpretation of Section
609's embargo provision, while appropriately sensitive to
international implications, predated and was not dictated by the
WTO Appellate Report .... [While] WTO reports have no
binding effect and provide no legal basis for altering domestic
law .. . it is domestic case law that calls upon the State
Department to construe Section 609 to minimize conflict with the
laws of nations, to the extent possible.'25
It is crucial to note that the State Department's arguments, that an ambiguous
statutory provision should, to the extent possible, be construed consistently
with the United States' international obligations," 6 was predicated on its
competence to "understand the international implications of any
interpretations."' 27 This is because Congress had delegated to it discretion on
a question involving international relations, and in such circumstances, "it is
generally assumed that Congress does not set out to tie the President's hands;
[since] if it wishes to, it must say so in clear language."'2 8 In addition, it was
domestic law, rather than international law, that the State Department invoked
to justify changing its Guidelines to conform with the United States'
obligations that had been established by the DSB.
My point here is that although the Federal Circuit did not reach the question
of deference to the State Department's Guidelines as formulated to be
consistent with an adverse DSB ruling, the court was effectively deferring to
the State Department by finding that the express provisions of the statute
supported its Guidelines. This is notwithstanding the dissent's assertion that
DSB decisions have no controlling status under U.S. law.'2 9 Rather than
uphold the 1998 Guidelines, the dissent would have struck them down
primarily because "[a]n agency interpretation of a relevant provision which
121 Id. at 21-22 (citing Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118 and Fed. Mogul, 63 F.3d at 1581).
126 Id. at 23.
127 Id.
2' Id. at 24 (citing Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Clinton, 236 F.3d 1320, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
129 Turtlelsland, 284 F.3d at 1303.
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conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is 'entitled to considerably
less deference.' ,130
The Turtle Island litigation, therefore, vividly illustrates two different lines
of cases on how a federal agency or court can construe an ambiguous statutory
provision in light of a DSB decision finding that a particular interpretation or
application of that provision was in contravention of the United States'
GATT/WTO obligations. In Turtle Island, the State Department invoked one
line of these cases to the effect that an interpretation and application of a
statute which would conflict with the United States' international obligations
would violate the intent of Congress. 3 ' This tradition can be traced to cases
such as Fundicao132 and Federal Mogul'33 which I discussed in Part II above.
By contrast, in the second line of cases such as Corus Staal' and Bowe
Passat,135 courts have held that if an agency's interpretation of a statute
conflicts with the United States' GATT/WTO obligations, it must give effect
to congressional intent even if doing so would be inconsistent with a DSB
decision. This reluctance to use DSB or GATT decisions as a guide to
construction of statutes in this line of cases is exemplified by the Court of
International Trade, which almost always asserts the primacy of domestic
statutes over GATT/DSB-based arguments. Thus, inFootwearDistributors,136
the Court of International Trade observed that "[h]owever cogent the reasoning
of the GATT panels.., it cannot and therefore does not lead to the precise...
judicial relief."' 37 Perhaps this should not be surprising for as Paul Stephan
has argued, the establishment of a special court with exclusive jurisdiction
over foreign trade, like the Court of International Trade, makes it susceptible
to overstate its role. 138 Under this line of cases, where the determination of the
Court of International Trade or the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals would be
inconsistent with a determination under GATT/WTO obligations, as in the
zeroing cases examined above, domestic statutes override GATT/DSB-based
130 Id. at 1302 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)).
131 See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
132 Fundicao, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 23; see also supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
"' Fed. Mogul, 63 F.3d 1572; see also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
114 Corus Staal, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1253; see also supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
135 Bowe Passat, 20 Ct. Int'l Trade 558; see also supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
136 Footwear Distris., 18 Ct. Int'l Trade 391.
137 Id. at 414; see also Avesta AB v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 493 (1988), affid, 914
F.2d 233 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
138 Paul B. Stephan, Further Reflections on the Implementation of Comparative Advantage
Principles in Trade Law, 2 J. LEGAL EcoN. 111, 115-17 (1992).
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arguments that would promote statutory constructions consistent with the
United States' international trade obligations.
Ultimately, in light of the two foregoing lines of cases, federal courts are
not invariably predestined to subordinate the United States' GATT/WTO
obligations under a DSB decision to U.S. statutes. The State Department's
role in the Turtle Island litigation makes it abundantly clear that agencies may
craft their policies to conform with these obligations, and courts can uphold
such policies as consistent with the clear meaning of a statute without reaching
the question of deference to policies crafted to conform with the United States'
obligations under a DSB decision. After all, executive agencies have the
competence to assess the international implications of the government's
policies, and it is within a court's discretion to hold that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains. "139
In Turtle Island,4 ' the court upheld the State Department's Guidelines even
though they were unfavorable to U.S. shrimpers whom the court held that
Congress had intended to benefit with § 609.' The effect of the decision was
therefore to subordinate the domestic interests of protecting these shrimpers
so as to ensure the United States kept its obligations as required in a DSB
decision.
In the next part, I consider a variety of objections that have been made
against the bindingness of DSB decisions within the United States, including
opposition from members of Congress and theoretical arguments. An
important purpose of this next part is to demonstrate why the Turtle Island line
of cases is unlikely to find favor as an alternative to the first line of cases,
where the U.S. legal system is thought of as being insulated from the
GATT/WTO legal system.
11. OBJECTIONS TO THE BINDINGNESS OF DSB DECISIONS, THE WIGGLE
ROOM THEORY, AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR
VIOLATING BINDING DSB DECISIONS
In this part I will explore why members of Congress and other critics of the
WTO in the United States have opposed giving DSB decisions a direct effect
within the U.S. legal system. I will then examine some of the leading
"9 Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118.
140 Turtle Island, 284 F.3d 1282.
141 Id. at 1294.
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academic approaches on the question of the status of DSB decisions within the
U.S. legal system. One such view holds that while DSB decisions to which the
United States is a party are binding upon the United States, DSB decisions
nevertheless provide wiggle room in their implementation. This wiggle room
view therefore sharply contrasts with the first line of cases, which hold that
DSB decisions have no effect in U.S. courts. This wiggle room theory has
much in common with the jurisprudence of the Turtle Island case. I end the
next section with an examination of the international legal consequences that
would arise from a violation of a binding DSB decision.
A. Objections to the Binding Nature of DSB Decisions
When a compulsory and binding dispute settlement system was proposed
during the Uruguay Round, critics in the United States immediately pointed to
these requirements as an example of how changes to U.S. law "at the behest
of an international organization" would thwart America's democratic
process. 42  These critics in particular pointed to the legalization or the
142 Letter from Robert E. Lighthizer, Deputy United States Trade Representative under
President Reagan, & Alan W. Wolf, Deputy United States Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations under President Carter, to Gloria Blue, Executive Secretary, Trade Policy Staff
Committee (July 10, 2000), available at http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/blue-letter.htm.
At the 1994 Hearings on the Implementing Legislation on the Uruguay Round, Senator Breaux
wondered aloud to the then U.S. Trade Representative, Michael Kantor,
Let me ask another question[ ] ... It is the question of the fact that if we have
a World Trade Organization somehow running the trade rules and regulations,
they are the umpire. They are the referee. If the group that serves as the
referee is 120 nations, or what-have-you, and the United States has 1 vote, I
mean, are we not giving up our legitimate interest? I mean, it always disturbs
me in international meetings when countries that are the size of this building
have the same equal vote as the United States, and I am not saying anything
derogatory against them because of their size, but to give them in these
international organizations the same weight as the United States or any other
developed country seems very unfair. Can you comment on that?
GA TTImplementing Legislation: Hearing on S.2467 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 103d Cong. 49-50 (1994) (statement of John Breaux, Sen.) [hereinafter
GA TT-SenateHearings]. In legal parlance, worriers of GATI'/WTO law and rulings overriding
U.S. law and democracy also argue that all agreements constraining U.S. sovereignty must be
subjected to the requirements of Article 2, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution,
which provides for Senate approval as a pre-condition of manifesting the United States' consent
to such agreements. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221, 1223 (1995)
(discussing and challenging the Congressional-Executive Agreement as an alternative to the
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juridicization 43 of GATT under the WTO's Uruguay Round dispute settlement
mechanism as further evidence that U.S. laws would be subjected to legal
scrutiny by an external adjudicatory body that had sanctioning power."' They
treaty form as put forth by Professors Bruce Ackerman and David Golove). At the Senate
Hearings on the Uruguay Round's implementing legislation, Tribe argued that it was not enough,
as the U.S. Trade Representative had argued, that GA'TT/WTO panel reports finding U.S. law
GATT/WTO inconsistent would not immediately override U.S. law because they nevertheless
provided the United States with some wiggle room. According to Tribe:
This is no answer at all ... [I]t amounts to an assurance that we might just
decide to violate our solemn commitments under the WTO agreement. Well,
what kind of argument is that? If that kind of reply could justify
circumventing the treaty clause, then it seems to me the only thing that would
count as a treaty would be a pact in which the United States solemnly turned
over all of its military power to a foreign body that could then simply force
us to do its bidding. But clearly the treaty clause encompasses vastly more
than that.
GA 77'-Senate Hearings, supra, at 292-93 (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Law,
Harvard University). According to Tribe:
[T]he treaty clause's provision for supermajority approval is an independent
guarantee of especially serious deliberation and especially strong national
consensus for those international agreements that significantly constrain
American sovereignty by seriously implicating normal State or Federal
lawmaking processes. It seems plain to me that the characteristics of the
WTO agreement plainly qualify it as the sort of agreement that ... warrants
a high degree of consensus and solemnity.
Id. at 295. By contrast, Bruce Ackerman countered Tribe's argument by stating:
[A]n effort to limit article 1 might be justified [since Tribe's position was
largely premised on the view that the legislative power under Article I and the
treaty power under Article II are not coextensive or inter-changeable - in
effect that that which the Constitution requires to be accomplished through
a treaty cannot be accomplished through mere legislation] if the Constitution
had explicitly said that "only" the Senate could give its advice and consent to
fundamental international agreements [Tribe would be correct]. But the text
of article II does not contain the word only. It simply creates an alternative
route which the President and the Senate may use if in their judgment it is
appropriate.
Id. at 313 (statement of Bruce Ackerman, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale
University). See also Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV.
L. REv. 801 (1995) (noting the displacement of the Treaty Clause with the advent of the
Congressional-Executive Agreement). This section borrows in part from Gathii, Insulating
Domestic Policy, supra note 3.
143 Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of the International Trade
Relations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 775, 784-809 (1997) (discussing the juridicization of
GATT).
'" Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
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objected to the DSB's authority to determine disputes between members under
the WTO Agreements with the power to require members and the United
States in particular to abide by its rules and procedures.1
45
Those taking issue with the commitments made by the United States in the
1994 Uruguay Round Agreements point to the possibility that the DSB could
authorize retaliatory sanctions against the United States for failing to
implement its recommendations as evidence of how the new dispute settlement
regime would undermine U.S. sovereignty.'46 According to these critics, this
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute
Settlement Understanding or DSU]. The DSU establishes the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
141 Id. art. 23.1. In the Section 301 case, the finding of the consistency between section 301
of the United States' Trade Act of 1974 as amended and GATI/WTO law raised the possibility
that Article 23 of the DSU is not the exclusive means of determining the nullification and
impairment of benefits under the GATT/WTO Agreements. See Panel Report, United States-
Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section
301 case]. The primary issue in the Section 301 case was whether article 23 of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding was the exclusive dispute settlement process of the WTO, and if so,
whether section 301 was inconsistent with it. The European Community had attacked section
301 as inconsistent with Article 23 of the DSU because it authorizes the United States to
unilaterally make determinations of injury based on GAIT/WTO law and to take
countermeasures which can only be undertaken pursuant to the GATT/WTO's Dispute
Settlement Understanding. In UnitedStates-Import Prohibition ofShrimp and Shrimp Products,
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU of Malaysia (Shrimp-Turtle fl), the Appellate Body upheld
a U.S. measure that unilateral trade measures directed at other countries' policies are not, in
principle, excluded from justiciability under Article XX. Moreover, the Appellate Body pointed
that this finding, which also legitimated the fact that unilateral trade measures could be used to
protect the environment consistently with the requirements of GATI', was not dicta but was in
fact intended to give guidance to future panels. See Appellate Body Report, United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Malaysia, 107, 137-38, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). See also B.S.
Chimni, WTO and Environment: Shrimp-Turtle and EC-Hormone Cases, 35 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 1752, 1752-61 (2000) (noting that the WTO has integrated environmental concerns with
its objective of free trade).
146 Steve Chamovitz argues that the mandatory nature of the DSU procedures, particularly
Articles 22.8 (which states that suspension actions "shall be temporary and shall only be applied
until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been
removed") and 23.2(c) (which provides that suspension actions are "in response to the failure
of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable
time period") amounts to a WTO-authorized sanction and that this departs from the practice
under Article XXXII of the 1947 GATT, which was construed as merely allowing compensation
equivalent to the value of damages assessed for a party's failure to carry out its obligations under
the Agreement. Steve Charnovitz, Should the Teeth Be Pulled?: An Analysis of WTO Sanctions,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT
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possibility would remove the flexibility that the United States or any other
country had under the GATT 1947 dispute settlement process to block the
adoption of panel recommendations, thereby making them inutile.147
HUDEC 602, 609-10 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002) (citing Dispute
Settlement Understanding, supra note 144, arts. 22.8, 23.2(c)). Charnovitz further argues that
the WTO's dispute settlement system changes the regime of compensation from the 1947 GATI',
whose central goal was to re-equilibrate (or restoring balance of benefits and obligations) to a
trading system that is based on sanctions and retaliation. He cites the authorization of trade
sanctions in the ECBananas case (Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, 6.3, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999))
and in the EC Beef Hormones case (Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)-Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, 19, 21, WT/DS26/ARB (July 12,
1999) as examples of where this new direction in dispute settlement has been effectuated.
Jackson argues that WTO rules are binding in the "traditional international law sense ...
although not always in a 'statute like' sense... However, the international law 'bindingness'
of a [panel] report certainly can and should have an important effect in domestic U.S.
jurisprudence, as in the jurisprudence of many other nation-states." Jackson, Dispute Settlement
Understanding, supra note 17, at 63-64. David Palmeter and Stanimir A. Alexandrov disagree
with Chamovitz and advance the view that the DSU, unlike the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, which provides for special remedy rules, continues GATT 1947
practice of re-equilibrating concessions as opposed to imposing sanctions. David Palmeter &
Stanimir A. Alexandrov, "Inducing Compliance " in WTO Dispute Settlement, in THE PoLICAL
ECONOMY 650-59 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
"' Article 16.4 of the DSU requires the DSB to adopt a panel report within sixty days of its
publication unless there is no consensus to adopt it. See Dispute Settlement Understanding,
supra note 144, art. 16.4. This differs from the practice of unanimous adoption under GATT
1947, which gave any one member the unilateral power to stand in the way of adoption. To
strengthen the case for the bindingness ofpanel reports under international law, consider Jackson
(who is otherwise critical of the view that the WTO would limit U.S. sovereignty) who
concludes: "in the light of the practice of GATT, and perhaps supplemented by the preparatory
work of the negotiators... [DSU clauses] strongly [suggest] that the legal effect of an adopted
panel report is the international law obligation to perform the recommendation of the panel
report." Jackson, Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 17, at 62-63. But see Judith
Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L.
416, 418 (1996) (concluding that "[t]he only truly binding WTO obligation is to maintain the
balance of concessions negotiated among members"). In addition, Ambassador Kantor argued
that failure to implement a panel report that finds a U.S. law inconsistent with GATT/WTO
Agreements would not require a change in U.S. law.
[Instead] ... the DSU provides for automatic authorization of retaliation on
request. That said, dispute settlement panels formed under the new agreement
will not have the power to change U.S. law order or us to change our laws.
We will remain free, as we are under GATT today, not to implement panel
reports.
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B. DSB Decisions Are Binding but Give the United States Wiggle Room
By contrast, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Kantor told a congressional
hearing on the Uruguay Round Implementing Legislation that fears of
American democracy and sovereignty being sacrificed "have no foundation."
48
Kantor also pointed out that U.S. law takes precedence over WTO
Agreements, 49 a principle that is further expanded in the Trade Act of 2002.50
GATT-Senate Hearings, supra note 142, at 42 (prepared testimony of Michael Kantor,
Ambassador, U.S. Trade Representative).
"4 GA TT-SenateHearings, supra note 142, at 55. Senator Rockefeller noted that in addition
to section 102, the bill also provided other safeguards, such as congressional review of the
United States' commitment to GATI/WTO every five years and the fact that state and other local
laws from GATTIWTO challenge, which together led him to conclude that he could "not imagine
how we could have protected our sovereignty more than we have under this agreement." Id. at
55 (statement of Jay Rockefeller, Sen.). By contrast, in a letter to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, then at Harvard Law
School, argued that: "Where an international agreement effectively supercedes or directly
constrains ordinary state and federal law-making authority, the people have in effect agreed to
delegate their sovereignty not to the state or federal governments, but to the federal government
acting in concert with a foreign government or governments." Letter from Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Ernest F. Hollings, Senator (Oct. 18, 1994),
reprinted in GA TT-Senate Hearings, supra note 142, at 287.
9 Section 102(a)(1) of the URAA provides: "No provision of any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is
inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect." 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994). In
addition, the Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) accompanying the URAA provides that
the decisions of the WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body, "have no binding effect under
the law of the United States and do not represent an expression of U.S. foreign trade policy."
H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1032 (1994). The SAA further provides that when a DSB report
"recommends that the United States change federal law to bring it into conformity with a
Uruguay Round Agreement, it is for the Congress to decide whether any such change will be
made." Id. In addition, the U.S. Code provides, "The statement of administrative action... [is]
an authoritative expression by the United States concerning the interpretation and application
of the Uruguay Round Agreements and this Act ...." 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d). Section (a)(i)
provides that "[n]o provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of
any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United
States shall have effect." Id. § 3512(a)(1).
IS' Section 2105(a)(4) of the Trade Act of 2002 provides that "[a]ny [trade] agreement or
understanding with a foreign government or governments (whether oral or in writing)... not
disclosed to the Congress... shall not be considered to be part of the agreement approved by
the Congress and shall have no force and effect under United States law or in any dispute
settlement body. 19 U.S.C. § 3805(a)(4) (emphasis added). Notice that the provision is very
broad, encompassing both written and non-written agreements.
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According to Jackson, sovereignty critics failed to appreciate the fact that
GATT obligations did not have direct effect in U.S. law, and that the United
States could choose to withdraw from the GATT if it was opposed to
implementing adverse recommendations. These arguments, in addition to
others led to his view that the United States had a buffer zone against GATT
and subsequently WTO agreements.' The late Robert E. Hudec, another
leading jurist of the trading system, argued that the process of negotiating trade
treaties and follow-up implementing legislation provides a setting within which
affected constituencies could participate and therefore confer legitimacy to the
outcome.' 52 In addition to these reassurances, the Trade Act of 2002 requires
the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and
Treasury, the Attorney General, and the U.S. Trade Representative, to report
to Congress regarding whether or not the DSB has "added to the obligations,
or diminished rights, of the United States."'5 3
The debate between those that thought that American sovereignty and
democracy would or would not be limited by the Uruguay Round Agreements
replicates an old debate on form and anti-formalism in international law. 15 4
Critics who oppose the United States for joining these agreements proceed
from a sovereignty-centered conception of obligation in international law. In
consenting to be bound to an international legal obligation, these critics argue
the United States is giving up its sovereignty. By contrast, Ambassador Kantor
and others who are agnostic about the United States giving up its sovereignty
by joining the WTO Agreements do not proceed from the formalist stance of
the significance of consent. Rather, they take the point of view that the WTO's
dispute settlement procedures should be seen as part of a larger informal
structure of open-ended and, at times, conflicting policy goals among trading
partners whose economies are integrated with the U.S. economy. They argue
that this structure has been negotiated through consensus such that it gives the
.5' See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 95-99 (1989).
52 ROBERT E. HUDEC, ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 219-23
(1999). Hudec further notes that domestic protectionist measures taken by state legislatures in
the United States express the electoral or democratic preferences and as such, they are not any
more legitimate-or "democratic"---than the expression of "electoral will achieved by the
process of authorized international negotiations plus implementing legislation." Id. at 223.
153 19 U.S.C. § 3805(b)(2)(D)(3).
154 See Richard A. Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60
AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966) (providing an excellent elaboration on the debate).
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United States broad discretion in protecting its rights and interests.'55 Thus,
Jackson has argued that WTO panel decisions are not legally binding on the
United States in the same way that formal interpretations of WTO Agreement,
through the super-majority requirements of a three-fourths majority of the
highest body in the WTO, the Ministerial Conference, are.156
Jackson has consistently maintained a dichotomy between the international
legal bindingness of DSB decisions and their effect on U.S. domestic law. Yet
this dichotomy inheres in it more than meets the eye. In 1994, when Jackson
first advanced the thesis on the bindingness of DSB decisions, he also noted
that a panel report "certainly can and should have an important effect in
domestic U.S. jurisprudence, as in the jurisprudence of many other nation-
states."' 57 Indeed, rather than casting WTO law as something completely
estranged from domestic law, as have some critics of DSB decisions, Jackson
has, perhaps more than anyone else, developed the relationship between the
155 The U.S. Trade Representative's office has, therefore, asserted that:
[The U.S.] government was careful to structure the WTO dispute settlement
rules to preserve our rights. The findings of a WTO dispute settlement panel
cannot force us to change our laws. Only the United States determines
exactly how it will respond to the recommendations ofa WTO panel, if at all.
If a U.S. measure is ever found to be in violation of a WTO provision, the
United States may on its own decide to change the law; compensate a foreign
country by lowering trade barriers of equivalent amount in another sector; or
do nothing and possibly undergo retaliation by the affected country in the
form of increased barriers to U.S. exports of an equivalent amount. But
America retains full sovereignty in its decision of whether or not to implement
a panel recommendation.
United States Trade Representative, AMERICA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 13 (1999),
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps2453 1/wto-usa.pdf.
156 John H. Jackson, The Perils of Globalization and the World Trading System, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 371, 380 (2000). Jackson emphasizes that the consensual character of the WTO
circumscribes its ability to override U.S. domestic law and policy. Id. at 382-83. Similarly,
Jackson has described the regime of international economic law of the WTO as presenting
themes and problems, such as the "dilemma of rule versus discretion," the" 'effectiveness' of
the 'trade rules,' "as well as others, rather than as a seamless legal web. JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 151, at 25. Jackson further argues in this pre-WTO book that in
the implementation of the Tokyo Round Agreements, the U.S. government (courts, executive
branch, and Congress) departed from theories of "strict sovereignty." Id. at 61. See also David
Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 7, 59-69
(1994) (discussing Jackson's international trade scholarship).
157 Jackson, Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 17, at 64.
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two as reciprocal rather than opposed, as interpenetrating rather than
independent, and as intersecting rather than estranged.15
C. Jackson 's Distinctive View ofthe Relationship Between WTO andDomestic
Law
Jackson's view of the relationship between domestic and international trade
law is informed by a view of WTO law that he describes as "rule
orientation."' He views this rule-oriented system as embedding within it
legal and policy goals that do not fit tightly onto the interpenetrating domestic
legal regimes of WTO member countries. 6 ' Thus, while he emphasizes the
binding nature of DSB decisions, he acknowledges that the implementation of
these decisions gives WTO members a safety valve to address troublesome
domestic controversies.' 6 ' Jackson's rule orientation thesis, however, arguably
extends beyond giving a safety valve to delay WTO member compliance with
DSB decisions and also includes the domestic implementation of WTO
obligations at the legislative, administrative, and executive levels. Jackson's
's A review of Jackson's founding role in the United States in the field of international-
economic law summarizes Jackson's view of the relationship between domestic and international
trade law as follows:
Jackson's academic achievement was to displace international business
transactions and the tradition oftransnationalism by capturing the intellectual
energy and hope for international public law and the felt necessity of dealing
with the "foreign" without losing the basic American legal materials and the
national private law order. By focusing largely on the reciprocal interaction
of national governmental and legislative institutions, he imagined an
international "trade constitution" which brought international trade into the
domestic public order to revitalize it as an international system... [H]e recast
clashes between national regimes not as political disputes awaiting
international regulatory harmonization nor as deeply estranged cultural
differences to be compared, but as an imperfect "interface" mechanism
through which different legal cultures related to one another.
Kennedy, supra note 156, at 62.
159 JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 151, at 127.
160 Kennedy, supra note 156, at 62.
161 Jackson, Obligation to Comply, supra note 16, at 122. For example, in United
States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, the
Arbitrator gave the United States more time to comply with an adverse DSB decision in the face
of congressional reluctance and delay in compliance. Award of the Arbitrator, United
States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, Arbitration
under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, WT/DS184/13 (Feb. 19, 2002).
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rule orientation has another element besides the legislative, executive, and
administrative flexibility that members have in domestic implementation of
WTO obligations. Rule orientation, according to Jackson, does not set up
WTO rules as necessarily creating a specific or categorical compliance
method.'62 Instead, under Jackson's view, WTO rules provide that the member
may choose the method of compliance. As such, compliance with WTO rules
provides what Jackson calls wiggle room for WTO members to protect their
rights and interests, while at the same time observing their WTO obligations.
D. US. Courts in the Foreign Affairs Context
In the first line of cases noted so far, U.S. courts do not treat DSB decisions
as either binding or even persuasive in a comparative law sense. 63 This seems
to square with Jackson's thesis that WTO rules and its dispute settlement
system provide member countries with wiggle room to accommodate their
implementation difficulties. As demonstrated in Part II, in many cases where
DSB decisions were cited, U.S. courts have resorted to a variety of techniques
of avoidance or deference to DOC interpretations or applications of U.S. law
that were arguably at odds with the United States' obligations under
GATT/WTO law and DSB decisions."6 Under this line of cases, the best a
U.S. court is willing to afford a DSB decision is to "inform" itself of such a
DSB decision in its own decision making process. This is notwithstanding the
fact that unlike most other international or foreign cases, DSB decisions in
which the United States is a party are binding on the United States as a matter
of international law.
165
The treatment of DSB decisions 166 as neither binding nor persuasive is
perhaps accounted for by leading international legal jurist Louis Henkin's
observations that "both [the] President and Congress can exercise their
respective constitutional powers regardless of treaty obligations, and the courts
will give effect to the acts of the political branches within their constitutional
162 Jackson, Obligation to Comply, supra note 16, at 122.
163 See Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 501 (2000) (proposing that although international law does not bind national
judges in an enforcement sense, it ought to be persuasive).
" See Eyal Benvenisti,Judicial Misgivings Regarding theApplication ofInternationalLaw:
An Analysis ofAttitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'LL. 159 (1993) (arguing that judicial
orders requiring national authorities to comply with international law are exceptional).
165 See supra note 16.
166 See supra note 16.
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powers even if they violate treaty obligations or other international law."' 67
Thus, as Henkin argues, "[i]f there is a breach of a treaty by the other party, it
is the President, not the courts, who will decide whether the United States will
denounce the treaty, consider itself liberated from its obligations, or seek other
relief, or none at all."' 68
E. The Responsibility of Domestic Institutions to Give Effect to International
Obligations
Although courts have to defer to the political branches regarding treaty
compliance or violations, another line of cases holds that "unless Congress
makes clear its intent to abrogate a treaty, a court will not lightly infer such
intent but will strive to harmonize the conflicting enactments."' 69  One
inspiration for this line of cases is the Charming Betsy doctrine, which the
Restatement notes requires courts, "where fairly possible," to avoid conflict
with an international agreement of the United States. 70 Further, while
Congress can enact statutes abrogating prior treaties and international
obligations, 7' Henkin has argued that it seldom uses this power.'72 The
167 Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 214 (Oxford Univ. Press
2d ed. 1996) (1972).
168 Id. Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "[u]nder our
constitutional scheme, Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so, and there is nothing
the other branches of government can do about it." Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461,466-67 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973) (holding that Congress had acted in disregard of
the U.S.'s treaty obligations). In the Head Money Cases, the Supreme Court held that a treaty
"depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the honor and the interest of the governments
which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamations... [but] with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and
can give no redress." Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (emphasis added).
169 Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 936-37 (1988)
(citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933)). Under international law, the "responsibility
to give effect to international obligations does not fall upon any particular institution of its
government, international law does not necessarily require that domestic courts apply and give
effect to international obligations." LORIF. DAMROSCHET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 161 (4th ed. 2001).
170 RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
... Whitneyv. Robertson, 124U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (noting that "Congress may modify such
provisions [treaties], so far as they bind the United States or supersede them altogether").
172 Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or "Political Question ": A Response, 101 HARV. L. REV.
524, 529 (1987) (arguing that "Congress has rarely enacted statutes in knowing violation of
treaties").
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difficulty with this argument and for this second line of cases is that in
enacting the Uruguay Round Implementing Acts and the accompanying
Statement of Administrative Action, Congress seemed to deliberately
subordinate the United States' international obligations negotiated in the
Uruguay Round to domestic implementing statutes. 173 To get around this,
courts in the second line of cases have argued that unless Congress clearly and
unequivocally exercises its power to abrogate treaties, they have a "duty to
interpret statutes in a manner consonant with existing treaty obligations
[because] [t]his is a rule of statutory construction sustained by an unbroken
line of authority for over a century and a half."' 74
F. Consequences of a Federal Court's Rejection of a WTO Decision Under
International Law or Misapplication or Rejection of International Legal
Obligations
Under the first line of cases discussed, DSB decisions are only relevant in
U.S. courts if the particular law governing the case at hand made it relevant.
In other words, DSB decisions are only relevant before a U.S. court in so-far-as
U.S. law and policy make them applicable.175 Thus, notwithstanding the fact
that DSB decisions in which the U.S. is a party are binding on the United
States as a matter of international law,'76 in the view of the first line of cases,
U.S. courts must give effect to congressional intent even if doing so would be
inconsistent with the United States' GATTiWTO obligations, including DSB
decisions.'77 Under this line of reasoning, a federal court is not free to
73 See, e.g., supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
174 United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982), Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984), Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979), Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953), Clark
v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 510 (1947), and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963) in holding that "[i]t has been a maxim of statutory
construction since the decision in [Charming Betsy] that 'an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violated the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains' ").
175 See Louis Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 178-82 (1967) (discussing the application of international law in U.S.
courts); see also United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that "treaties
affect the municipal law of the United States only when those treaties are given effect by
congressional legislation or are, by their nature, self-executing").
176 See supra note 165.
177 Suramerica, 966 F.2d at 668 (holding that "GATT does not trump domestic legislation;
if the statutory provisions at issue here are inconsistent with the GATT, it is a matter for
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invalidate a statutory interpretation adopted by an agency to avoid a potential
conflict with international law.'78 Ultimately, under this view, the United
States is free to accept, reject, acquiesce, implement, or even criticize such
decisions.179
Though it may be permissible to do so under domestic law, the rejection of
a binding international legal obligation would be a violation of international
law. This is so because a violation of international law is not excusable if it
was premised on the justification that the violation was held to be permissible
under domestic law 8' or the policy of a country otherwise bound by the
obligation.' In addition, if the violated norm is a rule of customary
international law, although WTO DSB decisions are not such norms, this
defense would also be unavailable.'82 In the final analysis, the United States
would be likely to have an aggrieved WTO member impose DSB-authorized
duties to compensate it for trade concessions lost by the violation of a
GATT/WTO obligation, both under the GATT/WTO law8 3 as well as under
general international law.184 Congress seems already to have anticipated
Congress and not this court to decide and remedy").
17' DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 574-75 (noting that "statutory interpretation ... would
normally be entitled to deference unless that construction were clearly contrary to the intent of
Congress"); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361,
368 (1986) (stating that "[t]he traditional courts pay to agency interpretation is not to be applied
to alter the clearly expressed intent of congress").
179 See, e.g., Suramerica, 966 F.2d at 668 (holding that "GATT does not trump domestic
legislation"); The Over The Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925) (stating that "[ilntemational
practice is law only in so far as we adopt it, and like all common or statute law it bends to the
will of the Congress").
180 RESTATEMENT § 311(3) ("A state may not invoke a violation of its internal law to vitiate
its consent to be bound unless the violation was manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental
importance.").
181 Louis Henkin, supra note 175, at 75, 178-82 (arguing that while international law would
be precluded from application where it was contrary to the public policy of the forum, it would
not make the United States any less bound to its international obligations).
182 Id.
183 This would be determined by the DSB. For example in The Tax Treatment for "Foreign
Sales Corporations" case, the DSB authorized the European Union to increase duties up to the
level of 100% for a total of four billion dollars of U.S. trade for U.S. non-compliance with an
earlier DSB ruling. See United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations,"
WT/DS108/26 (Apr. 25, 2003).
184 Factory at Chorzrw (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 ("[I]t is a principle
of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation
in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply
a convention and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself."); see also
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exactly this kind of an outcome. In 2002, it enacted a WTO Fund under the
2002 Trade Act for the payment of any total or partial settlement of disputes
before the WTO.'85
G. Would Rejection of DSB Decisions Establish an Alternative Norm on the
Status of DSB Decisions?
It may well be argued that a rejection of a DSB decision by a party to it
establishes an alternative norm regarding its status in relation to the United
States, which often resists constraints on its power under international law." 6
Under such an argument, the United States is freed from the constraints of
having to comply with DSB decisions, even if they are legally binding under
international law, because its domestic constitutional and legal frameworks
supersede the judgments of international tribunals. In fact, some scholars have
argued as much with regard to International Court of Justice decisions.
Under international law, such claims do not establish an alternative norm,
and it is hardly foreseeable that members of the WTO would acquiesce, even
if only rhetorically, to such unilateral declarations of disregard of international
obligations even by the United States. In fact, under international law,
departures from an international legal norm do not undermine but rather
confirm the efficacy of the norm.'8 7 Departures from the binding nature of
DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 169, at 161 (noting that where a domestic court disregards or
misapplies international law, an international tribunal would not have the power to reverse or
even set aside such a decision by a municipal tribunal, but the aggrieved state may be awarded
damages under international law).
85 19 U.S.C. § 3539 (2002).
186 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation ofPowers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 519 (1998) (noting that from the
U.S. perspective, in the twentieth century, the perceived risks associated with lawbreaking have
been reduced in light of the United States' global dominance).
' See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 186 (June 27)
(expounding on the inconsistency between actual practice and opiniojuris:
In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it
sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such
rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule
should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as
indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima
facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by
appealing to exceptions or justifications ... within the rule itself, . . . the
significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.
(emphasis added)).
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DSB decisions therefore confirm the binding nature of these decisions and do
not create an alternative rule damning down their status under international
law. These conclusions are valid vis-a-vis the United States, which has a
dualist system, though one would anticipate that they would be more
applicable in monist countries wherein international law is self-executing. 88
By contrast, in the United States, courts are not obliged to consider
international law applicable in its own right or as superior to the domestic law
and policy, as would be the case in a monist country.'8 9 Ultimately, when
federal courts disregard DSB decisions or GATT/WTO treaty commitments,
these decisions and commitments acquire two meanings-one in litigation in
U.S. courts and another in the United States' relations with other countries.' 90
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this Article, I have shown that there are two lines of cases on the
treatment of conflicts between DSB decisions and domestic statutes. Under
the first line of cases, represented by cases such as Corus Staal, courts decline
to rely on a DSB decision as the only basis for striking down a U.S. agency's
interpretation of a statute. By contrast, a second and less dominant line of
cases holds that the interpretation or application of ambiguous statutes requires
domestic courts, as a principle of domestic statutory construction, to interpret
ambiguous statutes in conformity with the United States' international
obligations. Under this line of cases, then, the claim for interpreting
ambiguous statutes is based on the premise that courts have the discretion to
defer to agency interpretations and applications that were made to conform
188 For an extensive analysis, see Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy, supra note 3, at 15-22.
119 F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 380 (1973) (arguing that "judicial
application of international law is, and ought to be, a matter of duty, not.., of mere right. In
other words the requirements of public international law are absolute and leave no room for the
relativity of public policy."); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423
(1964) (stating:
Although it is, of course, true that United States courts apply international law
as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances ... the public law of
nations can hardly dictate to a country which is in theory wronged how to
treat that wrong within its domestic borders (citations omitted));
F.A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-98 (1990) (detailing consequences
under international law of violating international legal norms).
19' See RESTATEMENT § 326, at n.4; see also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 472 (1913)
(noting that the non-observance of treaty obligations by a state makes that treaty voidable, not
void).
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with a DSB decision or a GATT/WTO obligation. Courts adopting this line
of reasoning, such as Turtle Island, therefore, give considerations of
minimizing conflicts with international law or avoiding violations of DSB
decisions significant interpretive weight. This is because the agencies
applying or interpreting the statute have the competence and expertise to take
into account the significance of a variety of factors, including whether or not
to minimize conflict between U.S. law and policy and whether or not to
minimize interference with the United States' GATT/WTO obligations.
By upholding domestic law in the event of a conflict between a DSB
decision and domestic law, courts in the first line of cases follow a
congressional pattern of insulating the United States from its international
trade obligations. This results in U.S. trade remedy laws protecting domestic
industries at the expense of the United States' treaty obligations. In addition,
by treating U.S. trade laws as superior to GATT/WTO treaties and by
declining to interpret and apply U.S. trade laws consistently with the United
States' GATT/WTO treaty commitments, federal courts adopting this
reasoning are, in effect, acquiescing to the derogation and disregard of the U.S.
treaty obligations by Congress and the executive branch.
Such a result, however, is not inevitable. In fact, the Turtle Island line of
cases demonstrates that where agencies craft their policies to conform with
DSB decisions, courts have the flexibility to uphold such policies as consistent
with the clear meaning of a statute. In so doing, courts give meaning to the
Charming Betsy doctrine that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. '19'
... Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118.
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